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How to rein in Russia’s shadow fleet

Elisabeth Braw is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, the author of the award-winning “Goodbye Globalization” and a regular columnist for POLITICO.
The aging, uninsured vessels with obscure ownership that constitute Russia’s shadow fleet continue to menace innocent countries. Western governments have tried sanctioning these vessels, finally issuing a stern “call to action” last month — but the fleet keeps sailing.
And yet, there are some participants in this shady trade that could be more receptive, and those are the countries buying oil transported by these shadow vessels — because they, too, face significant harm to their waters.
Last month delivered a frightening dose of reality: The tankers Hafnia Nile and Ceres I collided in Malaysian waters, resulting in blazes on both ships and a major hassle for the Malaysian authorities. The Hafnia Nile, sailing under the Singaporean flag, was operating legally, with some 300,000 barrels of naphtha on board. The Ceres I, however, sailing under the flag of São Tomé and Príncipe, was conducting more shadowy business.
Vessels that oblige maritime rules and norms don’t register under the flags of São Tomé and Príncipe, or other flags-of-convenience coming in near the bottom of the respectability ranking. And when the Ceres I and the Hafnia Nile collided, it was because the Ceres I was immobile in Malaysian waters as the result of mechanical problems. The Hafnia Nile tried to avoid hitting the tanker, but by the time the crew spotted it, it was too late. Such scenarios are why merchant vessels are required to use an automatic identification system (AIS), a maritime form of GPS that lets them know where other vessels are. The Ceres I, though, appears to have manipulated its AIS.
Unsurprisingly, the Ceres I belongs to the aforementioned shadow fleet, which sails under the flags of countries that have limited, if any, maritime expertise. The vessels are old; they lack proper insurance; their owners go to great lengths to hide their identity; and they often manipulate their AIS to obscure their movements. What’s more, like the Ceres I, these vessels transport highly hazardous cargo. And since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the shadow fleet has swelled rapidly — transporting sanctioned Russian oil is good business.
Everywhere they go, these shadow vessels — also known as dark vessels — pose a threat. They pose a threat to other ships, to the water and marine life. And until recently, when they mostly transported sanctioned Iranian and Venezuelan goods, or conducted the occasional drug run for South American narco-gangs, the situation was manageable in terms of shipping.
Today, though, over 1,400 ships are thought to have defected from the legal side of shipping to its dark side serving Russia, and the vast majority of them are now oil tankers.
This constitutes a significant chunk of the almost 51,000 ships that carry cargo around the world today, a large part of the world’s tanker fleet, and an especially large part of the traffic in waters near Russia’s ports, including the Baltic Sea.
Colliding with one of these ships is like being in a crash with an uninsured driver. Just like an uninsured driver is unlikely to ask for forgiveness, mend their ways and face the consequences of their actions, Russia isn’t going to stop exporting sanctioned oil simply because of accidents, oil spills or maritime pollution. As can be expected in a situation like this, the Hafnia Nile’s insurers now face having to pay for the damage caused by the collision, even though the Ceres I appears culpable.
The West’s sanctions on individual shadow vessels haven’t stopped this dangerous trend either. Gathering enough evidence to establish that a vessel is, indeed, a dark vessel operating on behalf of Russia requires a great deal of time and resources. And as soon as one vessel leaves the armada, another one — or two — joins.
But there are participants in this sorry spectacle that could be more receptive to nudges. Russia’s shadow fleet only exists because of countries willing to buy sanctioned Russian oil — that is, Russian oil above the price cap Western countries have imposed. Leading this group are China, India, Turkey, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, countries that may well not care about Western sanctions — or even about Ukraine. Indeed, these governments have openly remained on the sidelines of the Ukraine war, refusing to use their influence to convince Russian President Vladimir Putin to withdraw Russia’s troops.
Still, they, too, risk being harmed by shadow vessels. The shadow armada’s most obvious potential victims are, of course, the innocent countries whose waters they sail through. But the vessels can cause collisions, leak oil, malfunction, even sink in importer countries’ waters too. And recipient countries should be concerned about these risks. Any of these events would come at considerable expense to these countries, because — remember — shadow vessels lack proper insurance.
To be sure, countries can buy any oil they like. China, India, Turkey and the world’s other non-Western nations have no obligations to join the West’s sanctions against Russia or even comply with them. But the risks posed by Russia’s shadow fleet are very real for them too. And when the first serious oil spill occurs in their waters, their citizens will ask why their governments ignored such a hazard.

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